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Russia behind bars: 
the peculiarities of the Russian prison system
Jan Strzelecki
Russia is among the countries with the highest number of prisoners. Hundreds of thousands 
of inmates are supervised by an elaborate apparatus of the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN). 
This extended system is used as a tool for exercising control over society and solidifying the 
system of power. At the same time, it impacts the process of how shared norms and values 
are being formed in Russian society, in connection with society’s frequent contact with the 
so-called prison culture. Due to the absence of a major overhaul of the prison service, whose 
institutions and code of conduct date back to the time of the Soviet Gulag, the prison system 
is an excellent example of pathologies that are also present in other elements of the Russian 
state apparatus. These include the poor state of infrastructure, endemic corruption and the 
primacy of informal rules over the rule of law, consent to harsh exploitation of working pris-
oners and the omnipotence of the coercion apparatus.
The size of the prison system
At present, over  467,000 individuals are in-
carcerated in Russia’s prisons. In terms of the 
number of prisoners per  100,000 inhabitants, 
Russia is ranked first in Europe and 17th glob-
ally1. However, due to the fact that the figures 
many countries quote regarding the number of 
their prisoners are often hard to verify, this ra-
tio should be treated as an approximation. The 
present number of inmates in Russia’s prisons is 
among the lowest in the country’s history and 
has been gradually declining over recent years. 
A decade ago, the number of prisoners in Russia 
was almost double the present figure (893,000 
in 2008).
The decrease in the number of inmates has 
mainly been linked to the fact that the courts 
pronounce prison sentences for minor crimes 
1 Data compiled by the World Prison Brief, http://www.
prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief-data
less frequently and tend to apply other penalties 
(such as non-custodial sentences or community 
service). It has also been caused by demograph-
ic changes in Russian society: depopulation and 
an ageing population. Other factors include the 
closing of a significant number of penal colo-
nies with the least strict regime (over the last 
eight years almost a quarter of the total number 
of such colonies were closed down)2. As a con-
sequence, prison overcrowding decreased only 
marginally and there has been no evident im-
provement in prison conditions. The recidivism 
ratio also remains very high: around 63% of in-
mates in Russian prisons are reoffenders3.
2 ‘Вижу новости про «исторический минимум 
заключенных» в России. Это из-за закона «день за 
полтора»? Колонии массово закрывают?’, https://me-
duza.io/feature/2018/12/14/vizhu-novosti-pro-istorich-
eskiy-minimum-zaklyuchennyh-v-rossii-eto-iz-za-zako-
na-den-za-poltora-kolonii-massovo-zakryvayut
3 В. Никитеев, ‘Проблемы ресоциализации осужденных’, 
http://www.kipkr.fsin.su/upload/territory/Kipkr/mtb/
Сборник%20материалов%20Всероссийской%20
конференции.pdf 
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The reason behind the high number of prison-
ers in Russia is the repressive nature of the Rus-
sian judiciary as a whole. Most recent amend-
ments to the penal code have toughened the 
penalties4. Figures compiled by the Investiga-
tive Committee for 2015 show that acquittals 
accounted for a mere 0.4% of court rulings. 
This is why the fate of the accused is decided by 
prosecutors during their investigations. As far 
as the reasons for imprisonment are concerned, 
the largest group of prisoners are criminal pris-
oners, most of whom were convicted for mur-
der (27.8% of inmates). A similar proportion of 
prisoners are serving their sentences for drug 
dealing (25%)5, which likely results from the 
fact that the proceedings regarding possession 
of drugs are straightforward and investigators 
use them as an easy means of demonstrating 
the activity and efficiency of the prosecution 
bodies. Due to the repressive approach of the 
Russian law enforcement agencies and courts, 
the number of prisoners in Russia decreased at 
a slower pace than the crime rate did6. 
The Russian penitentiary system is organised 
in a different manner to corresponding penal 
systems in most countries: instead of cells in 
prisons the inmates are housed in barracks in 
penal colonies. In total, there are 869 such colo-
4 М. Никонов, ‘Развитие системы уголовного пра-
восудия: векторы, меры реформирования, основные 
игроки’, https://csr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Re-
port-12.01.2017-2.pdf, p. 7.
5 Cf М. Алехина, И. Рождественский, Г. Макаренко, 
‘Первые по числу заключенных’, РБК, 15 March 2017, 
https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/03/15/58c7023 
99a79473b36f47d9c 
6 ‘Расходы по неволе. Как дорого обходится стране 
уголовно-исполнительная система’, Коммерсантъ, 
13 February 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/321 
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nies of various regimes scattered across Russia, 
eight prisons and 315 remand centres. The geo-
graphical location of penal colonies is linked to 
the concept of economic development adopted 
back in Soviet times, when prisoners were used 
as forced labour, such as during the construc-
tion of large-scale investments carried out by 
the Soviet state including the White Sea-Baltic 
Canal and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), as 
well as in forestry in harsh weather conditions – 
in Karelia, for instance. Even today, the largest 
number of penal colonies is located in regions 
that are rich in natural resources (mainly for-
ests), such as Krasnoyarsk Krai and Perm Krai, 
or in highly industrialised ones, such as Sverd-
lovsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast and Primorsky 
Krai. The Republic of Mordovia is a special case, 
because it hosts a large number of penal col-
onies within a relatively small territory. There 
are regions in the Republic of Mordovia, the 
Komi Republic and Chuvashia, where work per-
formed by prisoners and individuals employed 
by the FSIN accounts for a major portion of the 
local labour market7. In these regions, the role 
of FSIN is particularly significant. Due to the 
geographical location of the penal colonies, 
prisoners serve their sentences far from their 
home towns. Those penal colonies that are lo-
cated in remote areas far from densely popu-
lated regions usually have harsher conditions: 
problems with running water and heating are 
common. Due to their remote location and in-
accessibility, these colonies are less frequently 
inspected by external bodies and the control 
mechanisms are weak.
The conditions in prisons
Prior to the court pronouncing their sentence, 
the suspects are held in remand centres. In 
Russia, custody is the most popular preventive 
measure (it is more frequently used than bail or 
7 А. Табах, ‘Подземная империя: половина продукции 
ФСИН идет налево’, Финмаркет, 12 February 2014, 
http://www.finmarket.ru/life/txt.asp?id=3627907
Over 467 000 individuals are incarcerat-
ed in Russia’s prisons. This places Russia 
first in Europe in terms of the number of 
prisoners per 100 000 inhabitants.
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a ban on leaving the country). In recent years, it 
has become increasingly popular8 (17.3% of all 
imprisoned individuals are held in remand cen-
tres). As far as the conditions of imprisonment 
are concerned, the time the suspect spends 
in the remand centre is often considered the 
harshest (a system was recently introduced ac-
cording to which one day spent in a remand 
centre counts as one and a half days spent in 
the facility in which the prisoner serves their 
actual sentence9). The same applies to the so-
called transfer stage, or the time during which 
the convict is being transported to their penal 
colony (in Russian: etap). 
Most often, prisoner transport is organised in 
special windowless railroad carriages known as 
Stolypin cars, in which prisoners in groups of 
ten are transported in compartments measur-
ing 3.4 m2. Moreover, neither the convicts nor 
their families know the train’s destination. One 
example is Ildar Dadin, a political prisoner sen-
tenced for repeated protests. After he exposed 
cases of torture in his penal colony, he was tak-
en to another location to serve the rest of his 
sentence and his transfer lasted one month. 
Due to the fact that most penal colonies are 
located far from densely populated areas, in-
mates held there are deprived of regular con-
tact with their families and lawyers and need to 
8 М. Никонов, ‘Меры пресечения: 5 главных проблем 
и их решение’, https://pravoirk.ru/archives/5900. Data 
compiled by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federa-
tion, http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=2074 
9 Э. Фанзисов, ‘Как начал работать долгожданный 
закон «День за полтора»’, Тюремный консультант 
Руси сидящей, 8 August 2017, https://vturme.info/
kak-nachal-rabotat-dolgozhdannyj-zakon-den-za-polto-
ra/
be transported over long distances, which was 
assessed negatively by the European Court of 
Human Rights and other bodies10.  
The conditions in which the prisoners serve their 
sentences depend on the type of the specific 
penal colony. In Russia, there are four types of 
penal colonies each with a different regime. In 
the least strict penal colonies, the so-called col-
onies-settlements, the inmates can freely move 
around the facility, they are usually housed in 
large barracks, can leave the colony on a pass 
quite frequently, meet with their relatives and 
wear civilian clothing. In ordinary regime pe-
nal colonies, the supervision by the guards is 
much stricter, the inmates are housed in large 
barracks with up to 150 beds in each, are under 
constant supervision and cannot move around 
the facility freely. In strict regime and special 
regime penal colonies, the inmates face more 
restrictions, they are housed in locked cells usu-
ally with 20–50 other prisoners. Due to over-
crowding, in most colonies the required stand-
ard of two square meters of space per inmate, 
which is stipulated in Russian law, is usually not 
met. It should be noted that this standard is 
50% of the standard stipulated in the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights which Russia 
has ratified11. Another important factor that im-
pacts on prison conditions is the policy of the 
local FSIN officials and of the governor of the 
specific prison. 
The conditions in which the inmates serve their 
sentences in penal colonies are also impacted 
by the poor state of infrastructure that the FSIN 
has at its disposal. Most facilities were built 
before 1970 and a large portion of them date 
back to tsarist times. In most prisons, the state 
of repair and the overcrowding make it difficult 
10 В. Гефтер, ФСИН злоупотребляет правом распреде- 
ления заключенных. Но готов встать на путь 
исправления?, 10 July 2018, http://antipytki.ru/2018 
/07/10/fsin-zloupotreblyaet-pravom-raspredeleniya-zak-
lyuchennyh-no-gotov-vstat-na-put-ispravleniya/ 
11 A. Bobrik, K. Danishevski, K. Eroshina, M. McKee, Pris-
on Health in Russia: The Larger Picture, https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/7834446_Prison_Health_
in_Russia_The_Larger_Picture
The conditions in which the inmates 
serve their sentences in penal colonies 
are mainly impacted by the poor state of 
infrastructure, mostly built before 1970, 
as well as by overcrowding.
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for the inmates to maintain basic hygiene. This 
leads to regular outbreaks of epidemics. For 
years, one of the major problems in Russian 
prisons has been prisoners developing AIDS 
and tuberculosis. According to data compiled 
by the FSIN, up to a third of deaths in prisons 
are caused by AIDS. Despite this, over the last 
couple of years the mortality rate among Rus-
sia’s prisoners has declined12. It is extremely dif-
ficult to quote any estimates regarding prison 
mortality rate. Human rights defenders claim 
that the health statistics are not credible be-
cause most cases of prisoners falling ill are not 
reported13. 
Respect for human rights in Russian prisons is 
the subject of country-wide debates. In the first 
seven months of 2018 alone, the Russian press 
revealed 24 cases of torture in prisons14. In re-
cent years, the most appalling cases reported 
by the media included the torture of Yevgeny 
Makarov in penal colony no. 1 in Yaroslav and 
the death of two prisoners in Chelabinsk in 
201515. Abuse is common, even official statistics 
12 ‘Смертность в исправительных учреждениях ФСИН 
снизилась на 9,6% в 2016 году’, РИА Новости, 20 Feb-
ruary 2017, https://ria.ru/society/20170220/1488383898.
html 
13 А. Рыкова, ‘Смерть за решёткой. От чего умирают 
российские зэки’, Life.ru, 10 July 2017, https://life.ru/t/
%D0%B7%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2
%D1%8C%D0%B5/1024540/smiert_za_rieshiotkoi_ot_
chiegho_umiraiut_rossiiskiie_zeki
14 ‘Все сообщения о пытках 2018 года в одной таблице. 
Их уже больше полусотни’, Медуза, 9 August 2018, 
https://meduza.io/feature/2018/08/09/vse-soobscheni-
ya-o-pytkah-etogo-goda-v-odnoy-tablitse-ih-uzhe-
bolshe-polusotni 
15 ‘Челябинск: для фсиновцев, убивших заключенного 
Исраилова, требуют до 12 с половиной лет’, Грани, 
24 October 2018, https://grani-ru-org.appspot.com/So-
ciety/Law/m.273470.html 
indicate that it is practised on a mass scale. The 
inspections the FSIN ordered when the scandal 
over the torture of Makarov broke out, showed 
168 recent violations involving FSIN officials 
using force and ‘special measures’ against pris-
oners16. Most of these violations were incidents 
where physical coercion was used in rooms 
with no CCTV monitoring. Harsh conditions in 
prisons and violence against inmates are the 
reasons behind the riots that periodically break 
out in penal colonies. Official FSIN data indicate 
that each year there are on average around 15 
such riots but experts argue that the actual 
number is higher17. In recent months one such 
event was witnessed in penal colony no. 6 near 
Omsk: a conflict involving 150 individuals re-
sulted in clashes in which four individuals were 
injured and taken to hospital18.
The FSIN empire
Administration of the prison system and su-
pervision of the thousands of inmates is the 
task of the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) 
which employs 325,000 individuals19. Despite 
the decline in the number of prisoners, the 
number of FSIN employees has not decreased 
significantly since its establishment in 1998. 
As a consequence, in Russia the proportion of 
the number of prison system employees to the 
number of inmates is 2.3 times higher than the 
corresponding figure recorded for the USA20. In 
2017, the FSIN’s budget was 257.6 billion rou-
16 ‘ФСИН выявила 168 нарушений порядка применения 
силы в колониях и СИЗОФСИН выявила 168 
нарушений порядка применения силы в колониях 
и СИЗО’, Интерфакс, 12 October 2018, https://www.
interfax.ru/russia/633116 
17 О. Романова, ‘С чего начинается бунт’, Новая Газета, 
12 May 2015, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/ 
2015/05/12/64098-s-chego-nachinaetsya-bunt 
18 ‘Волнения в ИК-6 Омска’, Zona Media, 7-11 October 
2018, https://zona.media/chronicle/ik6#21125 
19 Data for 2015.
20 Е. Коростелева, Обзор Предложений по Совершен-
ствованию Системы Исполниения Наказаний, https://
csr.ru/wp-content /uploads/2017/10/20171017_Re -
port-Prisons.pdf, p. 22.
The Federal Penitentiary Service is a power-
ful financial machine. Aside from the federal 
budget subsidy, the FSIN receives revenue 
generated by manufacturing plants operat-
ing in penal colonies.
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bles (around US$ 4.5 billion), which accounts 
for around 1.5% of Russia’s total budgetary 
spending (more than twice as much as Mol-
dova’s total budgetary spending). This ranks 
Russia first in Europe when it comes to prison 
system spending in absolute numbers21. 
The Federal Penitentiary Service is a powerful fi-
nancial machine. Aside from the federal budget 
subsidy, the FSIN receives revenue generated by 
manufacturing plants operating in penal colo-
nies. In 2016, this stood at around 50 billion 
roubles22 (over US$ 800,000). Most contracts 
under which prisoner labour is used cover the 
production of clothes, textiles and foodstuffs, 
as well as the execution of construction works. 
The contractors mainly include institutions as-
sociated with the FSIN and a portion of the 
goods manufactured by prisoners are sold in 
the grey market outside the reach of official 
statistics. The scale of this unregistered output 
is extremely difficult to assess. However, some 
sources claim that its actual size is as much as 
double that of registered production23. In this 
way, a parallel market is being created for the 
FSIN’s needs, in which prices are regulated top-
down, labour is virtually unpaid and statistics 
21 М. Алехина, И. Рождественский, Г. Макаренко, 
‘Первые по числу заключенных’, РБК, 14 March 2017, 
https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/03/15/58c7023 
99a79473b36f47d9c
22 ‘ФСИН оценила годовые доходы от производства 
в тюрьмах в 50 млрд рублей’, 18 October 2016, https://
rns.online/economy/FSIN-otsenil-godovie-dohodi-ot-
proizvodstva-v-tyurmah-v-50-mlrd-rublei--2016-10-18/ 
23 А. Табах, ‘Подземная империя: половина…’, op. cit.
are fake. All this enables FSIN officials to sell 
a portion of the manufactured goods in the 
grey market.
Around 25–40% of prisoners perform paid 
work while serving their sentence24. According 
to the law, work is compulsory for most pris-
oners but the number of jobs available is insuf-
ficient. Performing work while serving one’s 
sentence is one of the main criteria for an early 
release from prison. It also enables the prisoner 
to enjoy privileges such as additional visits by 
relatives or being allowed to watch TV. Failure 
to meet production targets often results in re-
strictions on visits, compulsory physical exercise 
and, most importantly, a refusal to be granted 
early release from prison. There are numerous 
accounts suggesting that prisoners who refuse 
to work for a long period of time (for example, 
in a situation where the facility’s management 
is behind schedule)25, are beaten. The criteria 
for an early release are unclear, which enables 
the prison guards not only to discipline prison-
ers, but also to force them to work harder, to 
recruit informants and to force bribes.
Most prison manufacturing plants deal with 
textile and timber production. The salaries paid 
to prisoners are low because 75% of the money 
is used to fund the prisoner’s room and board 
in the penal colony. Low salaries are also the re-
sult of the colony’s supervisors setting inflated 
targets regarding prisoners’ work, which ena-
bles them to reduce the amounts of remunera-
tion paid out to inmates. Human rights defend-
ers argue that the average monthly salary paid 
to prisoners working in prison manufacturing 
plants ranges between 400 and 5000 roubles 
(US$ 6 to 80 per month).
Despite the fact that the prestige associated 
with working in the prison system is low and 
that the FSIN has a rather poor image in soci-
ety (as opposed to special services such as the 
24 И. Халецкая, ‘Кто не работает, тот ест. Сколько 
зарабатывают заключенные’, РИА Новости, 11 March 
2018, https://ria.ru/20180311/1515928668.html
25 Numerous accounts published for example on http://an-
tipytki.ru/ 
The FSIN operates as a unique ‘state within 
a state’ with no supervision mechanisms, 
but with a separate health care service, 
transportation system, education system, 
a unique system of trading in goods char-
acterised by widespread corruption, and 
the primacy of informal rules and hierar-
chies over formal ones.
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Federal Security Service), certain social groups 
and residents of certain regions view employ-
ment with the FSIN as a stable and desirable 
job. As a consequence, due to tough com-
petition in many locations it not easy to find 
employment in the prison system. A frequent-
ly selected career path involves enrolling at 
a school run by the FSIN, in which students are 
offered special training for prospective prison 
system employees from an early age (in some 
locations the FSIN even runs primary schools). 
Employment with the FSIN is linked to various 
non-salary benefits. The officers receive room, 
board and other benefits offered to employees 
of uniformed services (including easier access 
to health care and the opportunity to take part 
in the beauty contest knows as “Miss FSIN”). 
Some of the pathologies of the prison system in 
Russia result from the absence of independent 
supervision mechanisms (even the physicians 
who monitor the inmates’ health are function-
aries of the prison apparatus). This makes the 
FSIN a unique ‘state within a state’.
For around two years, Russian media has re-
ported on the prospective reform of the FSIN, 
involving a change in its leadership and even 
the transfer of the service from the Ministry of 
Justice to the Ministry of the Interior (until 1998 
the prison system was supervised by the inte-
rior ministry). These press leaks confirm that 
a game is underway for control of this major 
component of the law enforcement system and 
that attempts are being made to curb and ra-
tionalise the FSIN’s spending. In the unofficial 
hierarchy within the Russian services, the FSIN 
occupies the bottom rung. This may encourage 
other law enforcement agencies to try to sub-
jugate ‘the FSIN empire’ to themselves or prove 
their effectiveness by exposing scandals in the 
prison service.
Imprisonment as a tool of political 
repression
Human rights organisations point to the large 
number of politically-motivated criminal trials 
in Russia. Amnesty International emphasis-
es that repression and persecution of human 
rights defenders, restrictions on freedom of ex-
pression, cultural freedoms and minority rights 
are particularly common26. According to data 
compiled by the Memorial Human Rights Cen-
tre, in 2018 195 political and religious prisoners 
were incarcerated in Russian prisons27. 
Recent years have seen a significant increase 
in the number of political prisoners, which 
was mainly connected with the annexation of 
Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian war – a large 
number of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians ac-
cused of extremism have recently been incar-
cerated in remand centres and penal colonies 
on political charges. A portion of Ukrainian po-
litical prisoners, including Oleg Sentsov, a film 
director sentenced in a show trial in Russia for 
20 years in prison (according to the prosecu-
tors he had planned to blow up the Lenin stat-
ue in Crimea), went on a hunger strike during 
the 2018 FIFA World Cup and demanded that 
all (more than 60) Ukrainian political prisoners 
should be released. The protest ended in a fias-
co despite the fact that it was a blot on the im-
age of the Russian leadership during the World 
Cup and contributed to several world leaders 
boycotting the tournament. The Russian gov-
ernment’s determination as regards this issue 
26 A report by Amnesty International, “Russian Federation 
2017/2018”, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/eur 
ope-and-central-asia/russian-federation/report-russi 
an-federation/ 
27 Memorial Publishes Lists of Political Prisoners in Russia, 
30 October 2018, https://memohrc.org/en/news_old/
memorial-publishes-lists-political-prisoners-russia
In contemporary Russia, political trials 
are among the basic tools the government 
uses to tackle political opposition and an 
instrument used in rivalry among compet-
ing groups within the elite.
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is linked to the fact that show trials of Ukraini-
an activists are intended to deter the residents 
of Crimea from demonstrating their loyalty to-
wards Ukraine. 
In contemporary Russia, political trials are 
among the basic tools the government uses to 
tackle political opposition. In recent years, the 
most well-known political trials were those of 
Alexei Navalny. Between the beginning of 2017 
and September 2018, Navalny spent a total of 
140 days in remand centres and penal colonies 
for organising protests and taking part in them. 
Political lawsuits are frequently given priority in 
court schedules – over 17 working days that 
followed the protests Navalny had organised 
in Moscow on 26 March 2018 the Tver District 
Court in Moscow alone heard 476 cases against 
the protesters. Criminal trials are also used as 
a tool in the rivalry between specific pow-
er-holding groups for influence in the Kremlin. 
Former prominent politicians, such as Alexei 
Ulyukaev, former minister of economic develop-
ment, are now incarcerated in penal colonies. 
Ulyukaev’s trial was inspired by Igor Sechin, the 
CEO of Rosneft, and was intended to intimidate 
the more liberal portion of the apparatus of 
power and demonstrate the rising importance 
of Sechin himself. 
Large-scale human rights violations in prisons 
and the absence of effective mechanisms in 
state institutions to counteract this phenome-
non have become a catalyst for Russian socie-
ty’s self-organisation. A social movement and 
a number of non-governmental organisations 
have formed around the issue of defence of 
prisoners’ rights. The most prominent ones 
include Rus Sidyashchaya (Russia Behind Bars), 
the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 
OVD-Info and Memorial. The employees of Rus 
Sidyashchaya, which offers help to prisoners 
and their families, include individuals who used 
to be prisoners themselves (for example, peo-
ple persecuted following the protests in Bolot-
naya Square in Moscow in 2011 and 2012), as 
well as lawyers and journalists. Frequently, the 
individuals who receive support from the activ-
ists are victims of so-called commissioned cases 
or lawsuits brought by public prosecutors who 
had been bribed for example by the victim’s 
business competitors. OVD-Info and Memori-
al, for their part, are two major organisations 
that gather and expose information on political 
prisoners, arrests and protests. Organisations 
involved in defending prisoners’ rights and crit-
icising the actions of the state’s law enforce-
ment agencies operate under constant pressure 
and are aware that they may become subject 
to inspections and repressions at any time (this 
is why Olga Romanova, the leader of Rus Si-
dyashchaya, had to leave the country). Even the 
relatively efficient prisoner support organisa-
tions are not capable of eliminating the prob-
lems of the Russian prison system as a whole. 
Their operation (similarly to the operation of 
organisations of soldiers’ mothers who pro-
tested against the war in Chechnya and against 
bullying in the military) confirms the theory 
that Russian society is able to demonstrate its 
capability for self-organisation, when facing 
a threat. 
Prison culture
Another manifestation of the unique nature of 
the Russian prison system is the presence of 
its informal code of behaviours and customs. 
This code sets the rules of prison life, including 
the standards of addressing guards and fellow 
prisoners, the rules regarding tattoos, and oth-
er detailed requirements, such as the ban on 
using the colour red in prison. All this serves 
Large-scale human rights violations in 
prisons and the absence of effective mech-
anisms in state institutions to counteract 
this phenomenon have become a catalyst 
for Russian society’s self-organisation.
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to create a parallel reality with an alternative 
hierarchy. “Vory v zakone” (воры в законе, lit-
erally: “thieves in law” which in free translation 
means “criminals of honour”) are at the top of 
this hierarchy. They form a group that has its 
separate informal code of conduct (including 
a ban on disclosing the rules of prison life and 
details about the criminal world) and elects its 
own informal leader. The importance of this 
individual is confirmed by the fact that in Au-
gust 2018 the process of electing the new “thief 
in law” no. 1 was covered by Russia’s major 
newspapers28. Prison culture norms observed 
in Russia’s remand centres and penal colonies 
date back to Soviet times and are also valid in 
most of the republics of the former USSR. 
In most prisons, informal rules prevail over the 
official code of conduct. The supervisors of pe-
nal colonies value their peace of mind (which 
is guaranteed when there are no protests and 
complaints to the public prosecutor’s office). 
In achieving this peace of mind, they are usu-
ally helped by the prison committee (Russian: 
“блаткомитет”) or a small group of prisoners 
associated with criminal groups, who are ready 
to use violence to ‘pacify’ the rebellious fellow 
inmates. In exchange for this, the penal colony 
supervisors offer them access to banned sub-
stances such as alcohol and drugs, as well as to 
mobile phones, and turn a blind eye to other 
violations of prison rules. 
Corruption is widespread in the prison system, 
which makes the conditions for serving a prison 
sentence dependent on the inmate’s financial 
28 ‘Избран новый «вор в законе № 1»’, Газета, 
20 August 2018, https://www.gazeta.ru/social/
news/2018/08/20/n_11927161.shtml 
status. In recent months, Russian media report-
ed extensively on the affluent life in a penal col-
ony in Amur Oblast of a prisoner sentenced for 
the gravest crimes, and published eye witness 
accounts and photos of the individual. He of-
fered bribes to prison guards, which enabled 
him to use rooms intended for staff only, or-
der caviar to his cell, made shashliks and used 
private health care29. According to Olga Ro-
manova, a well-connected criminal is able to 
arrange comfortable living conditions in prison 
for himself using a network of his accomplices 
remaining at large. Romanova has reported on 
situations whereby these criminals permanently 
occupied special rooms intended for longer 
visits and were issued bogus health certificates 
confirming their disability, in order to be trans-
ferred to an upgraded cell or a prison hospi-
tal. She also mentions that a prisoner who was 
recognised as an ‘authority’ was even granted 
consent to have a free-standing dacha built on 
the premises of the penal colony, surrounded 
by a garden, and to employ his private cook and 
gardener. According to Romanova, this practice 
is common and unofficial price lists are used for 
many services 30.
The unique nature of the Russian prison sys-
tem has also been shaped by the frequent 
contact society has with prison facilities and 
by the popularity of prison culture. For rep-
resentatives of certain social groups, serving 
a sentence in prison forms part of a typical life 
history amongst males, a stage in life com-
parable to military service. The popularity of 
prison culture is reflected, for example, in the 
presence of practices typical of prison life and 
the criminal world in Russian politics and busi-
ness, as well as in politicians using expressions 
29 А. Иванова, ‘Кто такой Вячеслав Цеповяз? Как он 
связан с бандой Цапка?’, Anews, 6 November 2018, 
https://www.anews.com/p/100385862-kto-takoj-vy-
acheslav-cepovyaz-kak-on-svyazan-s-bandoj-capka/
30 О. Романова, ‘Цеповяз и другие ВИП-осужденные. 
Зачем нужна роскошь в российских тюрьмах’, Carne-
gie.ru, 20 November 2018, https://carnegie.ru/commen-
tary/77743 
The unique nature of the Russian prison 
system mainly results from the presence 
of an informal code of behaviours and cus-
toms observed in prisons.
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derived from prison slang and prison songs in 
their official statements. The most well-known 
example of this was the statement by Vladimir 
Putin in which he justified the Russian air raids 
on Grozny, which marked the beginning of the 
war in Chechnya in 1999, using words derived 
from criminal slang – he said that he will “waste 
the terrorists in the outhouse”. 
Summary
Most Russian penal colonies and prisons were 
built back in Stalinist times. Despite several at-
tempts to reform the prison system in Russia, 
they still resemble the Soviet Gulag: human 
rights violations and torture are common, the 
prison service is a machine that knows well how 
to hide pathologies and earn extra money (for 
example, by taking bribes and engaging in fi-
nancial swindles). Among the most alarming 
statistics regarding the Russian prison system is 
the high rate of recidivism. It has increased over 
recent years31 and is proof of the inefficiency of 
the prison system as a whole. 
However, this inefficiency is not a problem for 
the government because in Russia the prison 
system is mainly a part of the machine used 
for exerting control over society and ensuring 
the stability of the system of power. During 
31 В. Никитеев, op. cit. 
his annual press conference on 20 December 
2018, President Putin confirmed that there are 
no plans to reform the prison system. When 
asked about the possible reform of the FSIN in 
connection with the reports on prisoners being 
tortured, he answered that it would be neces-
sary to make the prison system more efficient 
but that no thorough changes are needed. 
The absence of supervision of what happens in 
prisons by independent institutions aggravates 
the repressive nature of the system as a whole 
and affords new opportunities for using it as 
a tool of political repression32. As a conse-
quence, the FSIN operates as a unique ‘state 
within a state’, lacking supervisory mechanisms 
yet possessing its own health care service, trans-
portation system, education system, a unique 
system of trading in goods characterised – as is 
typical of Russian power structures – by wide-
spread corruption, and the primacy of informal 
rules and hierarchies over formal ones. There 
is no indication that in the upcoming years the 
practice of using imprisonment as a handy tool 
for removing rebellious citizens, as well as polit-
ical and business rivals, will be curbed. 
32 According to the report by Amnesty International, the 
level of social control and the transparency of the prison 
system has recently decreased, https://www.amnesty.
org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/russian-feder-
ation/report-russian-federation/ 
